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The costs associated with unhealthy food consumption are not only paid by those
suering from overweight but by all members of society in terms of higher costs for social
security systems. With this in mind, we study the eectiveness of a tax, a subsidy and
cash incentives in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Using an inter-temporal rational
choice model with habit, we calibrate and simulate the eect of those policies to US and
UK data. Our ndings suggest that cash incentives may be the most eective policy
in reducing unhealthy food consumption yet it can be the most costly one. Taxes are
relatively ineective in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Subsidies have the best
balance between eectiveness and monetary benets to the society.
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11 Introduction
Worldwide obesity has more than doubled since 1980 due to the increased intake of energy-
dense foods with high levels of fat, salt and sugars but with low bre and vitamins; and a
decrease in physical activity (World Health Organization (WHO)). In the US, 68% of the
population over twenty years old was overweight or obese during 2007-20081. In the UK,
57% of the population over sixteen years old was overweight or obese in 2008.
Overweight and obesity represent an economic problem for governments because they can
cause negative externalities in terms of higher cost for the social security system. In the US,
the obesity-attributable medical expenditures were 9:1% of total annual medical expenditures
in 1998, and approximately one-half of these expenditures were nanced by Medicare and
Medicaid2 (Finkelstein et al. (2003)). Most recently, Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2011) suggest
that 20:6% of US national health expenditures are spent treating obesity-related illness. In
the UK, the overweight and obesity attributable medical expenditures were 16:2% of the total
costs for the National Health Service (NHS) in 2006-07 (Scarborough et al. (2011)).
In order to reduce overweight and obesity, governments have responded with a variety
of interventions, including traditional public policies like product taxes (e.g. tax on sugared
beverages), and educational and informational programs (e.g. promoting the advertisement
of the health consequences of unhealthy food consumption and adding nutritional intake in-
formation on food packages). Lately, some governments (US, UK and Mexico among others)
have proposed a ban on the sale of highly sugar-lled products in public schools in order to
keep children away from unhealthy foods3. Local governments in the US, like Texas, New
York and California, have already introduced such policies. Some European countries, like
Denmark, Romania, Hungary and France, recently started taxing foods that have negative
eects on healt4. In the UK, the government introduced in 2007 a banning on private adver-
tising of foods that are high in fat, salt and sugar, in or around programmes specically made
for children5. Currently in the UK there is a discussion concerning the use of incentives to
promote healthy behaviour6. This discussion has been motivated by some examples where
local incentive schemes had been piloted. These included people receiving cash for losing
1According to the WHO, a person is overweight when his Body Mass Index (BMI = Kg=m
2) is greater
or equal to 25 and obese when his BMI is greater or equal to 30.
2Medicare is a social health insurance program for those aged 65 and over (or who meet other special
criteria) and Medicaid is a social health insurance program for those eligible individuals with low incomes.
Both of these programs are administered by the US government.
3The New York Times, February 07, 2010.
4See, for instance, BBC News October 01, 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15137948.
5Television Advertising of Food and Drink Products to Children, Ofcom Statement, February 2007.
6NICE Citizens Council meeting, May 20-22, 2010, www.nice.org.uk.
2agreed amounts of weight, and children being rewarded with toys in exchange for eating
more fruit and vegetables.
This paper addresses the following questions: are taxes, subsidies and cash incentives
eective in reducing unhealthy food consumption? If so, which one is the most appropriate
policy to tackle the obesity problem?
In order to answer these questions, we use a model where consumers face an inter-temporal
decision problem on the healthiness of the diet to follow. Choosing an unhealthy diet has the
advantage that it is less expensive and more convenient than selecting the healthy alternative
diet. However, whilst the healthy diet has no long term consequences in future utility, the
unhealthy diet decreases future utility as it causes the agent to be less healthy. This trade-o
between present and future consumption is further spiced up with the existence of habit: the
marginal utility from eating either healthy or unhealthy food at any point in time depends
on the consumer's past diet. This means that, for instance, a consumer who is used to follow
a healthy diet derives more utility from eating healthy foods than a consumer who is used to
eat unhealthy.
Within the setting just described, we consider the eects of three dierent policies on
the population level of unhealthy food consumption: a tax on unhealthy food, a subsidy to
healthy food and cash incentives in the form of a monetary reward to those consumers who
decrease their unhealthy food intake. We use a calibration approach to simulate the eect of
these three policies in two countries, the US and the UK.
Our results suggest that cash incentives may be the most eective policy to tackle the
obesity problem because it ensures a greater reduction in the number of people with un-
healthy diets. This is because, given the discount factor and the presence of habit, most
consumers' behavior depends on their initial diets. Hence, since most consumers initially
choose unhealthy diets, motivating healthy food consumption via cash incentives has a sig-
nicant positive eect on the aggregate level of unhealthy food consumption. However, when
we consider the benets due to the reduction in costs for the social security system and the
implementation costs of each policy (net benets), we nd that cash incentives has lower net
benets. In fact, cash incentives may have negative long term benets in the US and the
UK. In this case, whether cash incentives is a desirable policy depends partly on the social,
non-monetary, benets of having a healthier population.
Taxes is the least eective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption. This is be-
cause of the dierences in prices between healthy and unhealthy food; given the low cost of
unhealthy food a 10% tax has a small eect on the relative price dierence between unhealthy
and healthy food.
3Subsidies, on the other hand, are relatively eective in reducing unhealthy food consump-
tion and can lead to a signicant surplus when the savings to the social security system are
considered. In particular, our calibration shows that with a 10% subsidy to healthy food the
government can save in the long term up to $874 billion in the US and $56 billion in the UK.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Next we present a discussion on the
relevant literature. In section 2 we describe the model. A particular case of the model is
presented in section 3 whilst section 4 analyses the general case. In section 5 we calibrate
the model and simulate the eect of the dierent policies on the level of unhealthy food
consumption in a population. Finally, in section 6 we present the conclusions.
1.1 Literature
Even though there is a large debate around eating habits and its health and economic con-
sequences, not much work as been devoted to the issue of unhealthy food consumption. As
Goel (2006) points out, the economics literature on obesity is still in its infancy. Only few
papers have studied the agent's decision to consume unhealthy food while rationally consid-
ering the adverse eects on health. Levy (2002) considers a dynamic model of non-addictive
eating to explain overweight, underweight and cyclical food consumption. He nds that when
certain physiological, psychological, environmental and socio-cultural conditions are present
an expected lifetime-utility maximiser chooses to be overweight. Yaniv (2002) uses a rational
decision model to explain individual's deviation from a prescribed low-fat diet when there
is the possibility that the consumer suers a heart attack in the future. Yaniv nds that
excess high-fat consumption may be due to the fact that the risk of a heart attack drives the
individual to behave more oblivious of the future. Dragone and Savorelli (2011) study how
social conformism can aect individual eating behavior within a framework where individuals
are aware of how food consumption aects body weight. They show that it can be optimal
to be on a diet despite being underweight, or to binge despite being overweight. The rest
of the existing literature on this topic is empirical, and focuses mainly in the causes of the
observed rise in overweight and obesity (see, for example, Cutler et al. (2003), Gruber and
Frakes (2006), and Rashad et al. (2006)).
To our knowledge, only few papers analyse the economic implications of dierent gov-
ernment policies targeting consumers' diets. Acs and Lyles (2007) suggest that providing
calorie information to individuals may only have small eects on food choices. Yaniv et al.
(2009) use a food-intake rational choice model to address the eect of a tax on junk food
and a subsidy on healthy meals. They show that a fat tax will reduce (increase) obesity for
a non-weight-conscious (weight-conscious) individual, while a thin subsidy may increase obe-
sity for a non-weight-conscious individual. Fletcher et al. (2010) study how soft drink taxes
4combat the rising levels of child and adolescent obesity. They show that soft drink taxation,
as currently practised in the US, leads to a moderate reduction in soft drink consumption by
children and adolescents. However, according to their study the reduction in soda consump-
tion is completely oset by increases in consumption of other high-calorie drinks.
Our theoretical model builds on Becker and Murphy (1988) but focuses on the unhealthy
food consumption problem instead of any general addictive behaviour. The most salient
dierence is that in our model agents cannot over-eat; what makes an individual overweight in
our model is not how much she eats but the lack of healthy foods in her diet. This implies that
the consumer's problem is not one of choosing when to stop consuming unhealthy food but
on how to balance unhealthy food consumption with healthy food consumption. Moreover,
in our model time is discrete which allows us to better calibrate and interpret the model.
2 The Model
Before dealing with a population of agents, we rst deal with the individual behaviour by
considering the inter-temporal decision problem of a single consumer.
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;2;::: Food can be of two types: healthy and
unhealthy. We consider that unhealthy food is any food that is not regarded as being con-
ducive to maintaining health, i.e. food that is high in fat, salt and sugar, and low in bre and
vitamins. We assume that the total amount of food the consumer purchases at any given
period is normalized to one. The decision of the consumer at any given point in time is how
much of unhealthy food x 2 [0;1] to purchase. Denote by xt the value of x at time t. Thus,
1   xt is the intake of healthy food in period t. We refer to a diet as the value of x. When
comparing two diets, we say that a certain diet is healthier than another one if its amount
of the unhealthy food x is lower. Notice that our focus is to study the consumer's decision
on how healthy she wants to eat and not on the total amount of food intake. That is, we are
concerned about the composition of the consumers' diet, not about over-eating.
To capture the long term eects of the dierent diets, we assume that although both
the unhealthy and the healthy food are equally useful in feeding the consumer, they dier
in that the unhealthy food has a negative health eect in the future. The healthy food, on
the other hand, has no long term consequences. Even though unhealthy food has a negative
eect in the future, it may be attractive because it is more convenient than the alternative,
healthy food: unhealthy food is cheaper in monetary terms (see, for instance, Monsivais
(2010)), takes less time to cook (pre-cooked meals vs elaborated meals), is easier to nd (fast
food restaurant versus buying raw ingredients at the supermarket) and easier to dispose of
(disposable packaging versus doing the dishes). All these eects are summarized by assuming
5that unhealthy food is more expensive than healthy food.
As just discussed, each time period the consumer faces a trade-o: healthy food is better
in the long run but has a higher cost today. We use the standard economic modeling approach
of endowing the consumer with an utility function that recreates this trade-o. In particular,
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where fxkgt
0 is the sequence of present and past consumption of unhealthy food. The function
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where D(x0;1   x0) represents the consumers' initial diet and it is set to some arbitrary
value in [0;1]. The parameter  2 [0;1] captures the eects of present and past consumption
of unhealthy food, and represents the characteristics of the consumer in terms of lifestyle,
genetics, etc. That is, at time t, past consumption of unhealthy food negatively aects current
utility through the term D
 
fxkgt 1
0 ;1   xt 1
, and current consumption of unhealthy food
negatively aects current utility via the term  xt. Thus, for a given amount of unhealthy
food consumption, a consumer with a high  derives less utility than other consumer with a
lower .
The function D is assumed to be linear and in the form described above to simplify







= 1 x. The function v represents the eects of a certain diet
on the consumer's utility. The function v is dierentiable with v0 > 0, v00  0. If v00 > 0 then
there is habit formation as we discuss in detail in section 4. The parameter m > 0 represents
the agent's endowment, and px, p1 x with 0 < px < p1 x, are the prices of the unhealthy
and healthy food respectively.
Each period t the consumer maximizes the discounted sum of future utility by choosing
a sequence fxkg1
k=t with xk 2 [0;1] for all k  t. If we disregard the constant terms the
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where  2 [0;1] is the discount factor. The trade-o the consumer faces in its maximization
problem is clear: unhealthy food negatively aects her future utility through the function v,
yet at the present period it is cheaper than the healthy alternative.
6Notice that the consumer faces exactly the same problem at every t and, hence, it suces
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:
Note that although our model builds on Becker and Murphy (1988), there are signicant
dierences. The consumer's problem in our model is not one of choosing when to stop
consuming unhealthy food but on how to balance unhealthy food consumption with healthy
food consumption. This dierence is due to the fact that we have normalized the amount of
food the consumer purchases in order to focus on the healthiness of her diet. As a result, the
consumer in our model does not face a budget constraint.
3 A Simple Case
As an initial step to understand individual behaviour, we study a particular case of our
model where v is the identity function. If v is the identity function then the utility is linear
in the consumption of unhealthy food. Thus, in this case there is no habit formation as the
consumption of unhealthy food in the present period does not aect the marginal utility of
consuming unhealthy food in future periods.
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We have the following result:
Proposition 1. Assume that v is the identity function. The diet that maximizes the dis-







1 if p1 x   px  

1+(1 ) > 0;




for all r 2 [0;1].
According to Proposition 1, the agent's optimal long run diet is to consume only unhealthy
(healthy) food when the price dierence between healthy and unhealthy food (p1 x   px) is




In this section and henceforth we assume v00 > 0. This means that increasing the consump-
tion of unhealthy food increases the future return of consuming unhealthy food. Similarly,
increasing the consumption of healthy food increases the future return of consuming healthy
food. Therefore, if a consumer increases her consumption of unhealthy food then she is more
likely to increase it even more in the future, and similarly if she increases the consumption
of healthy food.
Take any arbitrary period t. Since for all fxkgt 1
0 it is true that D
 
fxkgt 1
0 ;1   xt 1
2
[0;1] for any  2 [0;1], there exists a  xt 1 2 [0;1] such that D
 
fxkgt 1
0 ;1   xt 1
=
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= 1 x. Thus, we can interpret  xt 1 as the weighted average diet the
consumer has followed in the past up to t   1.
Using this denition and disregarding the constant terms, we can rewrite the maximization
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We have the following result:
Proposition 2. Let  x 2 R be such that
v

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  p1 x = v
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k=t that maximizes the discounted sum of utility is given by
x =
(
0 if  xt 1 <  x or  is suciently high
1 if  xt 1 >  x and  is not suciently high:
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where v0 is the derivative of v with respect to D at time i. If we now compute the second
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@2xk > 0 the optimal sequence fxkg1
k=t has xk 2 f0;1g for all k =


















































Hence, if at the optimum xt = 1 then at the optimum xt+1 = 1. Iterating on this reasoning
we can conclude that if at the optimum xt = 1 then it must be that at the optimum xk = 1
for all k = t;:::;1. Using similar steps, it can be shown that if at the optimum xt = 0 then
the optimum has xk = 0 for all k = t;:::;1. Therefore, the optimal sequence of unhealthy
food consumption is such that fxkg1
k=t = fxg1
k=t with x 2 f0;1g.
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. Thus, if  xt 1 <  x then the optimum has xk = 0 for all k  t.
If  xt 1 >  x then by similar arguments as those used above, the consumer derives maximum
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. Hence, although the consumer
derives more one period utility at time t if she consumes xt = 1, if  is high enough the gain
in utility from consuming xt = 1 instead of xt = 0 does not oset the long term loss in utility.
In this case we have that there exists a threshold value   such that if  <   then the optimal
diet is xk = 0 for all k  t whilst if  >   then the optimal diet is xk = 1 for all k  t.
Proposition 2 states that a consumer would follow a healthy diet if and only if either she
is used to eat healthy or if she is patient enough with respect to future consumption. Notice
that the proposition gives no explicit equation of neither  x nor  . These two values depend
on the specic function v and the value of the parameters and, thus, are computed when we
calibrate and simulate the model.
In principle the value of  x could be outside the interval [0;1]. If  x < 0, the consumer
follows a healthy diet regardless of her past consumption and discount factor. On the other
hand, if  x > 1 then whether the consumer follows a healthy diet or not depends on her
discount factor.
9Notice that proposition 2 states that a consumer either purchases only unhealthy food
or only healthy food. This result is a direct consequence of assuming that only one unit of
food is consumed per period and that v00 > 0. This dichotomous result poses no problem
for interpreting the model, rather the opposite, it makes the interpretation easier. The link
between the healthiness of the diet chosen by the consumer and her weight in this framework
is as follows. When the consumer chooses to eat unhealthy (x = 1) we consider she is
overweight. On the other hand, when the consumer chooses to eat healthy (x = 0) she is not
overweight. This simplies the interpretation in our model when we introduce a population
of consumers (next section), so dierent agents will choose dierent diets with x 2 f0;1g.
Therefore, on aggregate a certain percentage of the population will eat unhealthy and be
overweight, and the rest of the population will eat healthy and not be overweight.
5 Policies
In order to study the eect of dierent policies on the unhealthy food consumption in a pop-
ulation, we assume that consumers are dierent in their parameter . As already mentioned,
the parameter  is meant to capture characteristics such as lifestyle, genetics, peer eect,
etc. Hence, a population with a higher average  can be interpreted as a society that is
more concern towards its well being and how they look, exercise regularly, their bodies deal
better with the consumption of unhealthy food, has been historically more inclined towards
healthier foods, etc. In order to simplify the calculations we keep constant across agents the
discount factor  and the functional form of v.
The three policies we consider in this paper are a tax, a subsidy and cash incentives. A
tax is represented in the model by an increase in the price of unhealthy food from px to
px(1 + t), where t is the size of the tax. Similarly, a subsidy is represented by a decrease
in the price of healthy food from p1 x to p1 x(1   s), where s is the size of the subsidy.
Finally, cash incentives consists of a monetary reward of I whenever the individual consumes
healthy food. That is, with cash incentives we add to the utility of the consumer, Ut, the
term
P1
i=t i t1xtI where 1xt equals 1 if xt = 0 and 0 otherwise.
All three policies can reduce the population's consumption of unhealthy food and, there-
fore, they may have a permanent eect even if the policy is temporarily. This can happen
because by changing the optimal decision of a consumer at a certain point in time her habits
change and, thus, it is possible to also aect her future decisions. More specically, consider
a consumer who nds it is optimal to choose the unhealthy diet. Therefore, by proposition
2 we must have that  xt 1 >  x. When policy P 2 ft;s;Ig is implemented, if we let  x(P) be
the value of  x in proposition 2 when such policy is introduced, then given that v0;v00 > 0 we
10have  x(t);  x(s);  x(I) <  x. Therefore, we could have that  xt 1 <  x(P) with P 2 ft;s;Ig and
the consumer chooses the healthy diet when a policy is introduced. If this happens, then
it is possible that a consumer moves from a situation where  xt 1 >  x to a situation where
 xT+t 1 <  x after the policy P has been implemented for T periods. From time T +t on, the
consumer follows the healthy diet even if the policy is removed.
5.1 Calibration
In this subsection we calibrate the model and simulate the eects of the three dierent policies
for the US and the UK.
We assume that the population is such that , a parameter that represents individual
characteristics, follows a normal distribution truncated between 0 and 1. We write this as
  N[0;1](;2), where as customary  is the mean and 2 is the variance. We set 2 = 0:1
and consider three dierent possible values for the mean,  2 f0;0:5;1g.
The initial consumption of unhealthy food, x0, is random and equal to x0 2 f0;1g. We
use a Bernoulli distribution and set at random x0 = 1 for 68% of the population and x0 = 0
for 32% of the population in the case of the US, and x0 = 1 for 57% of the population and
x0 = 0 for 43% of the population in the case of the UK. These values correspond to the WHO
estimates whereby 68% of the US population and 57% of the UK population is overweight7.
Each time period is set equal to a quarter and the discount factor is assumed to take the
value  = 0:987. Given that each time period represents a quarter, we have that 0:9874 =
0:949, which is in line with current studies where the annual discount rate is found to be
around 0:95 (see for instance Laibson et al. (2008)).
Given that each time period is a quarter, the prices px and p1 x represent the quarterly
spending on unhealthy and healthy food respectively. If a proportion y of the population is
overweight and e is the quarterly expenditure on food of an average consumer we have that
e = ypx + (1   y)p1 x:
Monsivais et al. (2010) estimate that the ratio between the price of healthy food and
unhealthy food is between 1 and 8:3, depending on the nutrient density of the food under
consideration. Using the fact that in our model all consumers purchase the same amount of
food per period we focus on an intermediate value for this ratio and set 4:5px = p1 x. Thus,
px =
e
y + 4:5(1   y)
: (3)
7We remind the reader that according to the WHO a person is overweight if her BMI is equal or above
25. Note that obese people (BMI  30) are also overweight.
11For the US, using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics8 we obtain that e = $1;610:75.
According to the WHO the proportion of overweight people in the US is y = 0:68. Hence, if we
harmonize to 2010 US dollars9, we have that px(US) = $769:50 and p1 x(US) = $3;462:76.
For the UK, the quarterly food spending is $659:1010. According to the WHO the pro-
portion of overweight people in the UK is y = 0:57. Hence, if we harmonize to 2010 British
pounds11, we have that px(UK) = $277:65 and p1 x(UK) = $1;249:41.
We assume the function v to be such that
v (D) = N(Dn)
where the exponent n > 1 and the scaling factor N > 0 are free parameters, and their values
are set to match the data of the country under consideration. In particular, we are looking at
values of n and N such that two conditions are satised. First, in the absence of any policy
the percentage of consumers choosing the unhealthy diet equals 68% for the US and 57% for
the UK. Second, amongst these consumers whose optimal consumption can be changed from
the unhealthy diet to the healthy one, i.e. consume x = 1 but would consume x = 0 if their
diet had been healthy in the past (x0 = 0), the maximum number of quarters needed for such
a change is six. We have found no empirical reference for the average time it takes for an
overweight person to achieve a BMI below 25 but we believe that a maximum of a year and
a half is a reasonable value.
Using the values of , px, p1 x and the distribution   N[0;1](;2) with 2 = 0:1 and
 2 f0;0:5;1g, we nd that a habit parameter of n = 50 and scaling factors of N = 2740 for
the US and N = 990 for the UK full our two desired requirements.
With respect to the dierent policies, we consider the value of the tax and the subsidy
is xed at 10%. This value is greater than the 1:5% to 7:25% soft drink and snack food tax
applied in dierent US states (Jacobson and Brownell (2000)). We choose a higher tax (and
subsidy) given that, as argued by Jacobson and Brownell (2000), current tax levels are too
small to aect unhealthy food consumption.
When considering cash incentives, we assume that the amount of money given to each
consumer per quarter equals to the dierence between the quarterly cost of consuming healthy
food and the quarterly cost of consuming unhealthy food. This ensures that all consumers
nd it is optimal to follow a healthy diet for at least as long as the policy lasts. Given the
numerical values derived above, we have that the quarterly amount of cash given must equal
8Consumer Expenditures in 2008, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
9CPI index, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
10Living Costs and Food Survey 2008, Oce for National Statistics.
11CPI index, Oce for National Statistics.
12$2;693:26 in case of the US and $971:76 in case of the UK. We could assume instead that
each consumer receives exactly the amount of cash needed to have the healthy diet as optimal
choice. However, this poses a problem from the applied policy point of view because it may
not be possible or feasible to discriminate amongst consumers.
The costs of implementing each policy are calculated as follows. We assume that taxing
unhealthy food has no implementation costs. The cost of implementing the subsidy is given
by the amount of the subsidy itself. The cost of implementing cash incentives equals the
amount of cash to be given per quarter to each consumer times the number of quarters
needed to change the habits of the consumer being targeted. We assume that cash incentives
are given only to those consumers who successfully change their unhealthy habits.
The benet of each policy is calculated by looking at the expense that does not occur if
a particular policy is implemented (avoidable costs). In our model, the avoidable cost is the
money that the security system saves because of the reduction in the number of overweight
people. In the case of a tax, in addition to the avoidable costs the revenue from the tax is
also considered as a benet.
To calculate the amount of money the social security system saves per overweight patient
we proceed as follows. In the US, according to Finkelstein et al. (2009) each obese patient,
on average, costs Medicare $600:00 per year more compared to a normal-weight patient12.
Patients enter Medicare at the age of 65 and live for an average of 77 years minus 3 years for
being overweight13. Thus, if we harmonize to 2010 US dollars and assume an annual interest
rate of 3%, then each overweight person costs Medicare on average $5;318:67.
In the UK, since we do not have information on the number of overweight people who
are NHS patients we use instead the number of overweight people in the country. This is a
sensible assumption because all UK residents have the right to NHS treatment14. The costs
to the NHS attributable to overweight people equals $5;146 million per year15 whilst the
number of overweight people in the UK in 2008 was 35:00 million (WHO). Therefore, the
cost per patient is $147:04 per year. Overweight people start receiving NHS attention at the
age of 5916 and live for an average of 77 years minus 3 years for being overweight. Thus, if we
harmonize to 2010 British pounds and assume an annual interest rate of 3%, each overweight
person costs the NHS on average $2;067:21.
12Measured in 2008 US dollars. We found no data on overweight only patients (BMI between 25 and 30).
13Oxford University research: http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/news stories/2009/090317.html.
14UK Department of Health.
15Measured in 2007 British pounds (Scarborough et al. (2011)).
16We do not have information on the average age overweight people start receiving NHS attention. However,
it was communicated to us by an NHS ocial in the Leicestershire Nutrition and Dietetic Service that the
average age in their NHS weight loss groups is about 59 years old.






x0 Bernoulli(0:68) (US), Bernoulli(0:57) (UK)
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cash incentives $2;693:26 (US), $971:76 (UK)
S.S. costs per overweight $5;318:67 (US), $2;067:21 (UK)
5.2 Numerical Results
We simulate the model for both the US and the UK and the three dierent policies for a
population of 100 consumers and then scale up the results to a population of 304:37 million
in the case of the US and a population of 61:40 million in the case of the UK17. We proceed
in this way so simulating the model is computationally more convenient.
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the simulations of our model given the calibration just
described. By looking at both tables, we can conclude that:
1. Cash incentives is the most eective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
2. However, cash incentives is the least protable policy and can lead to signicant mon-
etary costs.
3. Taxes are relatively ineective in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
17Population in 2008, US Census Bureau (US) and Oce for National Statistics (UK).
144. Subsidies is the most protable policy and relatively eective in reducing unhealthy
food consumption.
Table 2: Policy Comparison (US)
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Overweight no policy (%) 68 68 68
Tax
Overweight with policy (%) 36 57 68
Revenue 8,432 13,350 15,927
Benet 513,181 178,076 0
Benet + Revenue 521,613 191,426 15,927
Subsidy
Overweight with policy (%) 13 8 18
Subsidies 91,696 96,966 86,426
Benet 887,140 971,321 809,434
Benet - Cost 795,444 874,355 723,008
Cash Incentives
Overweight with policy (%) 21 1 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.77 3.33 4.75
Cost 677,522 1,828,089 2,606,856
Benet 757,630 1,084,642 1,084,642
Benet - Cost 80,108 -743,447 -1,522,214
2010 million US dollars unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money
collected from the tax. Benet: Avoidable cost to Medicare. Subsi-
dies: Expense for subsidizing healthy food. Periods p.p. (average):
Average number of periods per person during which beneciaries of
cash incentives receive the monetary payment. Cost: Total amount
of money given to beneciaries of cash incentives.
Cash incentives is the most eective policy to reduce the number of people with unhealthy
diets. This result is due to the fact that, given the discount factor and the presence of habit,
most consumers' behavior depend on their initial diets. Hence, given that most consumers
initially choose unhealthy diets, motivating healthy food consumption via cash incentives has
a signicant positive eect on the aggregate level of unhealthy food consumption.
The reason behind the ineectiveness of a tax is because, given the dierences in prices
between healthy and unhealthy food, a 10% change in the cost of unhealthy food has a small
15Table 3: Policy Comparison (UK)
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Overweight no policy (%) 57 57 57
Tax
Overweight with policy (%) 34 48 57
Revenue 580 818 972
Benet 29,192 11,423 0
Benet + Revenue 29,772 12,241 972
Subsidy
Overweight with policy (%) 13 7 18
Subsidies 6,674 7,134 102
Benet 55,846 63,461 49,500
Benet - Subsidies 49,172 56,327 49,397
Cash Incentives
Overweight with policy (%) 21 1 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.89 3.00 4.74
Cost 40,636 100,236 158,266
Benet 45,692 71,077 71,077
Benet - Cost 5,056 -29,159 -87,189
2010 million pounds unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money
collected from the tax. Benet: Avoidable cost to NHS. Subsi-
dies: Expense for subsidizing healthy food. Periods p.p. (aver-
age): Average number of periods per person during which bene-
ciaries of cash incentives receive the monetary payment. Cost:
Total amount of money given to beneciaries of cash incentives.
absolute eect. To illustrate this point, note that a 10% tax increases the quarterly cost of
unhealthy food by $76:95 in the US and $27:77 in the UK, while a 10% subsidy reduces the
quarterly cost of healthy food by $346:28 in the US and $124:94 in the UK.
Cash incentives are relatively costly and can lead to signicant monetary costs. This
is specially relevant in the US, where cash incentives, although very eective in reducing
unhealthy food consumption, can lead to a net long term expense of $1;522;214 million
dollars. The reason for this implication lies in the dierences between both countries' social
security systems. In the US an overweight person will generate costs to the public sector
during 9 years, while in the UK an overweight person generates such costs during 15 years.
16This explains why the monetary benets for the public sector for reducing unhealthy food
consumption are greater in the UK than in the US.
Finally, although higher values of  imply higher long term loss in utility from eating
unhealthy, higher values of  also make it harder to change from an unhealthy diet to a
healthy one. This is the reason why there is a non-monotonic relation between  and the
total consumption of unhealthy food when subsidies are considered. We do not observe such
non-monotonicity when the tax is considered because, as already argued, its absolute eect
is lower than that of the subsidy.
5.3 Obese Population
A reasonable question is whether we obtain the same results when only obese people are
considered. That is, if we regard consumers whose BMI is between 25 and 30 as not following
an unhealthy diet. This is the object of study in this subsection.
The parameters , , 2, t and  are set to the same values as the ones used in the
previous calibration. According to the WHO, 34% of the US population and 21% of the UK
population is obese. According to this information we set at random x0 = 1 for 34% of the
population and x0 = 0 for 66% of the population in the case of the US, and x0 = 1 for 21%
of the population and x0 = 0 for 79% of the population in the case of the UK.
Using equation (3), the fact that e = $1;610:75 for the US and $659:10 for the UK,
and y = 0:34 for the US and y = 0:21 for the UK, we obtain that px(US) = $491:81
and p1 x(US) = $2;213:16, and px(UK) = $184:73 and p1 x(UK) = $831:28 (all values
harmonized to 2010 prices). Note that in this case px and p1 x represent the quarterly costs
of following a diet that will lead to a person being obese and the quarterly costs of following
a diet that would lead to a person not being obese, respectively.
As in section 5.1, we look for values of n and N such that the percentage of consumers
choosing the unhealthy diet equals 34% for the US and 21% for the UK, and the maximum
number of quarters needed for a consumer to change her habits equals six. Using the values
of , px, p1 x and the distribution   N[0;1](;2), a habit parameter of n = 50 and scaling
factors of N = 1770 for the US and N = 668 for the UK full the two requirements.
With respect to the dierent policies under analysis, we use the same values as those
employed in the previous calibration except for two variables: cash incentives and social
security benets in the UK. Given the numerical values derived above, the quarterly amount
of cash given must equal $1;721:35 in case of the US and $646:55 in the case of the UK.
Moreover, taking into account that the number of obese people in the UK in 2008 was 12:89
17million18, then each obese person costs the NHS on average $2;507:83. Note that for the US
we assume each obese Medicare patient costs $5;318:67, which is the same value used in the
previous calibration.
The calibration when only obese consumers are considered is presented in table 4.
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cash incentives $1;721:35 (US), $646:55 (UK)
As before, we simulate the model and the three dierent policies for a population of 100
consumers and then scale up the results to a population of 304:37 million in the case of the US
and 61:40 million in the case of the UK. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the simulations.
By comparing tables 2 and 3 with tables 5 and 6 we can see that subsidies are now the
most eective policy in reducing the number of people with unhealthy diets. This is because
the dierence between px and p1 x when only obese people are considered is smaller than
the price dierence when overweight people are considered. This implies that the eects of a
10% subsidy are more acute.
Given that the dierence between px and p1 x when considering obese people is smaller
than with overweight people, the cost of cash incentives is also smaller with only obese people.
This is the reason why the ratio of eectiveness of cash incentives (number of people with
unhealthy diets) to their implementation costs is higher.
18Calculated as the percentage of obese people for UK in 2008 (WHO) to the population of the UK in
mid-2008 (Oce of National Statistics).
18Table 5: Policy Comparison (US), Obese Only
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Obese no policy (%) 34 34 34
Tax
Obese with policy (%) 21 28 32
Revenue 3,144 4,191 4,790
Benet 210,453 97,132 32,377
Benet + Revenue 213,596 101,324 37,168
Subsidy
Obese with policy (%) 7 2 3
Subsidies 62,648 66,016 65,342
Benet 437,094 518,038 501,849
Benet - Subsidies 374,447 452,022 436,507
Cash Incentives
Obese with policy (%) 13 5 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.62 3.00 4.03
Cost 178,133 455,823 696,833
Benet 339,962 469,472 534,227
Benet - Cost 161,830 13,648 -162,607
2010 million US dollars unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money
collected from the tax. Benet: Avoidable cost to Medicare. Sub-
sidies: Expense for subsidizing healthy food. Periods p.p. (aver-
age): Average number of periods per person during which bene-
ciaries of cash incentives receive the monetary payment. Cost:
Total amount of money given to beneciaries of cash incentives.
The calibration and simulation of the model when only obese consumers are considered
enforces the idea that subsidies seem the best alternative to solve the obesity problem.
5.4 Discussion: Alternative Social Security Costs (US)
In a recent paper Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2011) provide an alternative measure of the
marginal eect of obesity on medical care costs. They nd that an obese person raises
medical expenditures by $2;418 (in 2005 US dollars) relative to a non-obese person. Cawley
and Meyerhoefer suggests that previous literature has underestimated the medical costs of
obesity and, therefore, the economic rationale for government intervention to reduce obesity-
19Table 6: Policy Comparison (UK), Obese Only
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Obese no policy (%) 21 21 21
Tax
Obese with policy (%) 13 19 21
Revenue 147 214 237
Benet 12,318 30,080 0
Benet + Revenue 12,465 3,294 237
Subsidy
Obese with policy (%) 5 2 1
Subsidies 4,849 5,002 5,053
Benet 24,636 29,255 30,795
Benet - Subsidies 19,787 24,254 25,742
Cash Incentives
Obese with policy (%) 15 5 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.67 3.06 3.95
Cost 3,970 19,452 31,361
Benet 9,239 24,636 30,795
Benet - Cost 5,268 5,185 -565
2010 million pounds unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money
collected from the tax. Benet: Avoidable cost to NHS. Sub-
sidies: Expense for subsidizing healthy food. Periods p.p. (av-
erage): Average number of periods per person during which
beneciaries of cash incentives receive the monetary payment.
Cost: Total amount of money given to beneciaries of cash
incentives.
related externalities. Table 7 shows the result of the simulations of our model considering
the alternative obesity cost estimated by Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2011).
As it can be seen in table 7, most of our previous conclusions are still valid. The only
dierence is that with higher costs per obese person cash incentives no longer lead to a
decit in the social security budget. This is simply caused by the fact that now the benets
of reducing obesity are more acute. Nevertheless, we still nd that subsidies are the most
cost-eective policy.
20Table 7: Policy Comparison (US), Obese Only - alternative cost
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Obese no policy (%) 34 34 34
Tax
Obese with policy (%) 21 28 32
Revenue 3,144 4,191 4,790
Benet 934,992 431,535 143,845
Benet + Revenue 938,135 435,726 148,635
Subsidy
Obese with policy (%) 7 2 3
Subsidies 62,648 66,016 65,342
Benet 1,941,906 2,301,518 2,229,596
Benet - Subsidies 1,879,258 2,235,502 2,164,254
Cash Incentives
Obese with policy (%) 13 5 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.62 3.00 4.03
Cost 178,133 455,823 696,833
Benet 1,510,371 2,085,751 2,373,441
Benet - Cost 1,332,239 1,629,927 1,676,607
2010 million US dollars unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money col-
lected from the tax. Benet: Avoidable cost to Medicare. Subsidies:
Expense for subsidizing healthy food. Periods p.p. (average): Average
number of periods per person during which beneciaries of cash incen-
tives receive the monetary payment. Cost: Total amount of money
given to beneciaries of cash incentives.
5.5 Policy Recommendations
Given our results, subsidies are superior to taxes because subsidies are both more eective in
reducing unhealthy food consumption and they produce higher long term monetary benets
to the society. This suggests that governments should put their eorts into subsidizing healthy
food rather than taxing unhealthy food as many countries are currently doing.
Cash incentives is in most circumstances the best policy in reducing unhealthy food
consumption but it is an expensive alternative; cash incentives can lead to very signicant
long term looses for the government. Although subsidies are not as eective as cash incentives,
subsidies can signicantly reduce unhealthy food consumption and provide with the highest
21monetary benets to the society. In our analysis we have not made any reference nor claim
about the potential non-monetary benets of having a healthier population. Thus, although
cash incentives may lead to considerably monetary expenses and a decit in the social security
budget, it could be the case that the non-monetary benets of this policy o-set or justify
its implementation. That is an ethical and political issue that is not for us to discuss.
6 Conclusion
In order to handle the obesity problem governments have responded with a variety of inter-
ventions: product taxes, banning private advertising of foods that are high in fat, salt and
sugar, promoting advertising of the consequences of unhealthy food consumption, banning
sale of highly sugar-lled products in public schools, etc. Currently there is a discussion about
using cash incentives to promote healthy behaviour. Within this context, we addressed the
following questions: are taxes, subsidies or cash incentives eective to reduce unhealthy food
consumption? If so, which is the most appropriate policy to tackle the obesity problem?
Our results suggest that cash incentives can be the most eective policy in reducing un-
healthy food consumption. However, when we compare the benets due to the reduction
in costs for the social security system and the implementation costs of the policy, cash in-
centives can lead to signicant monetary losses. Taxes are relatively ineective in reducing
unhealthy food consumption. Finally, we found that subsidies have the best balance between
eectiveness and monetary benets to the society.
Our work contributes to the economic analysis of unhealthy food consumption and to
the public debate on how to tackle the obesity problem. The novelty of our paper is that
within this topic we built, calibrated and simulated a theoretical model to US and UK data,
thus quantifying the eects of the dierent policies. There are several issues that are left for
possible future research like considering hyperbolic discounting or assuming a non-separable
utility function amongst other. Nevertheless, this paper sheds new light on the issue of how
to tackle the obesity problem by suggesting that subsides, instead of taxes or cash incentives,
may be the solution.
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